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ACTIVE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: This study examines the conditions under which foreign subsidiaries 
maintain active boards of directors. Active boards are in this study defined as boards which 
perform tasks beyond fulfilling local legal requirements. We focus on both monitoring and 
service roles. 
Research Findings/Insights: Based on a sample of 83 foreign subsidiaries operating in Belgium 
with headquarters in 14 different countries, we find that a foreign subsidiary is more likely to 
maintain an active board if it is a world mandate subsidiary, which has worldwide responsibility 
for a product line and performs a broad scope of value-added activities. Moreover, a foreign 
subsidiary is more likely to maintain an active board if it is larger relative to the multinational 
enterprise (MNE), if it has a higher level of local responsiveness, and if its past performance is 
poorer. Additionally, the presence of an active board in a foreign subsidiary is related to other 
control mechanisms deployed in the subsidiary. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our results highlight the conditions under which foreign 
subsidiaries are likely to maintain active boards. Moreover, we provide empirical evidence that 
agency theory and resource dependence theory are relevant and complementary in the analysis of 
active boards in foreign subsidiaries.  
Practitioner/policy Implications: This study suggests that an active board may be a control 
mechanism to govern foreign subsidiaries and an instrument to deal with the external 
environment. Corporate governance regulators may consider developing governance 
recommendations that emphasize the importance of subsidiary boards in the oversight of foreign 
subsidiaries.  
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, subsidiary governance; board of directors; multinational 
enterprise; agency theory; resource dependence theory
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 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
        In many countries, corporate law requires foreign subsidiaries to have boards of directors1. 
Given the importance of foreign subsidiaries in the operation of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) and the complexities of managing geographically dispersed and culturally distant 
foreign subsidiaries, one would expect that MNEs use subsidiary boards strategically to govern 
foreign subsidiaries. However, in practice some subsidiary boards are only rubber stamps set up 
to fulfill local legal requirements (Björkman, 1994; Gillies and Dickinson, 1999). This raises the 
question of when subsidiary boards play an active role in the governance of foreign subsidiaries.  
This study addresses this issue by empirically investigating the conditions under which 
foreign subsidiaries maintain active boards. Active boards in this study are defined as boards that 
perform tasks beyond fulfilling local legal requirements. We focus on both monitoring and 
service roles. The corporate governance literature has investigated the composition and structure 
of boards in standalone firms (e.g., Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003; Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Pugliese et al., 2009; Van Ees, Gabrielsson 
and Huse, 2009; Zahra and Pearce, 1989) and codes of good governance in a given country (e.g., 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 2009; Cromme, 2005; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). However, 
very little research attention has been paid to subsidiary boards. As far as we know, none of the 
few empirical studies on subsidiary boards has addressed the conditions under which foreign 
subsidiaries maintain active boards. 
        The international business literature has investigated various control mechanisms used in 
MNEs, such as incentive compensation, subsidiary staffing, and corporate socialization (e.g., 
Ambos and Schlegelmilch 2007; Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; Chung, Gibbons and Schoch, 2000; 
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 3 
Gencturk and Aulakh 1995; Ghoshal and Nohria 1989; Gong, 2003; Jaussaud and Schaaper, 
2006; O’Donnell, 2000; Roth and O’Donnell, 1996). However, less is known with respect to the 
role of the subsidiary board as an alternative control mechanism for managing foreign 
subsidiaries. 
        Using survey and archival data from 83 foreign subsidiaries operating in Belgium with 
headquarters in 14 different countries, we find that a foreign subsidiary is more likely to maintain 
an active board if it is a world mandate subsidiary. A world mandate subsidiary is a subsidiary 
that has worldwide responsibility for a product line and performs a broad scope of value-added 
activities. Moreover, a foreign subsidiary is more likely to maintain an active board if it is larger 
relative to the MNE, if it has a higher level of local responsiveness, and if its past performance is 
poorer. Furthermore, the presence of an active board in a foreign subsidiary is related to other 
control mechanisms deployed in the subsidiary. In particular, a foreign subsidiary is less likely to 
maintain an active board if the subsidiary CEO holds a management position at the headquarters. 
        To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to empirically investigate the presence 
of active boards in foreign subsidiaries. Our results suggest that the agency problem between 
headquarters and subsidiary management, and the subsidiary’s dependence on the external 
environment are important to understanding the presence of active boards in foreign subsidiaries. 
Accordingly, both agency theory and resource dependence theory are relevant to the analysis of 
subsidiary boards and a combination of the two theories provides comprehensive explanations on 
the presence of active boards.  
        The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the 
literature on boards in standalone firms, control mechanisms in MNEs, and subsidiary boards. In 
the Hypothesis Development section, we then develop hypotheses on the presence of active 
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 4 
boards in foreign subsidiaries. In the subsequent two sections, we set forth our research method 
and results. Finally, we conclude with discussions, study limitations, and directions for future 
research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Boards in Standalone Firms 
        The literature on boards in standalone firms has been dominated by two theoretical 
perspectives: agency theory and resource dependence theory. According to agency theory, 
boards should reduce agency problems between shareholders and top managers (Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). Boards have the obligation of electing, evaluating, compensating and 
firing top managers in the best interests of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). Based on agency theory, many empirical studies have examined the relation 
between board composition (typically measured by the proportion of outside directors on the 
board) and firm performance (e.g., Bathala and Rao, 1995; Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 1997; 
Wan and Ong, 2005). These studies have reached mixed results, probably because board 
composition is endogenously determined (Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003). Additionally, there is a growing body of literature examining the determinants 
of board composition (Boone et al., 2007; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 
2009; Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008; Mak and Li, 2001). These studies suggest that board 
composition reflects a tradeoff between firm-specific benefits and costs of board monitoring, as 
well as the influence of top managers on boards.  
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 5 
        In contrast to agency theory, resource dependence theory views boards as important 
boundary spanners that make timely information available to top managers (Barney, Wright and 
Ketchen, 2001; Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009; Lockett and Thompson, 2001; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). The main board tasks include advice and counsel, channels of information and 
preferential access to key resources (Hillman et al., 2009; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Pfeffer, 
1972). Empirical studies show that board capital such as directors’ expertise, experience, 
knowledge, reputation, and interlocking directorates, is positively associated with firm 
performance (e.g., Boyd, 1990; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Dalton et al., 1999; Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). Moreover, firms respond to significant changes in the external environment by 
altering board structure (Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
 
Control Mechanisms in MNEs  
        An MNE consists of a group of geographically dispersed and culturally distant units that 
include its headquarters and different foreign subsidiaries (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990). 
Headquarters often exerts various control mechanisms over foreign subsidiaries to ensure that 
subsidiary management acts in accordance with the overall strategy of the MNE (Jaussaud and 
Schaaper, 2006). The literature has distinguished three broad types of control mechanisms: 
outcome control, behavioral control and cultural control (Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Jaeger, 1983; Ouchi, 1979). Outcome control monitors and evaluates the performance 
outcomes of subsidiary management. In contrast, behavioral control monitors the behavior of 
subsidiary management. While outcome control and behavioral control are explicit formal 
control mechanisms, cultural control, which is built on shared value and norms to control 
subsidiary management, is implicit and informal (Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; Ouchi, 1979). For 
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 6 
example, the use of expatriate managers and corporate socialization could build organizational 
identification and develop shared values at the subsidiary level (Chung, Gibbons and Schoch, 
2006; Gaur, Delios and Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003; O’Donnell, 2000). Cultural control is desirable 
only when outcome control and behavioral control are difficult to implement, because 
introducing cultural control entails high costs resulting from initial socialization and continued 
normative allegiance (Jager, 1983; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994; Stopford and Wells, 1972). 
Drawing on agency theory, foreign subsidiaries may have their own goals and risk 
preferences that differ from those of headquarters. Empirical studies based on agency theory find 
that headquarters use various control mechanisms to align the interests of subsidiary 
management with those of headquarters (e.g., Chang and Taylor, 1999; Nohria and Ghoshal, 
1994; Roth and O’Donnell, 1996). Drawing on resource dependence theory, foreign subsidiaries 
are interdependent with other units within the MNE in terms of resource exchanges (Birkinshaw 
and Morrison, 1995; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; O’Donnell, 2000). Moreover, foreign 
subsidiaries are instruments used by headquarters to seek resources from the external 
environment. Empirical studies in support of resource dependence theory find that headquarters 
use various control mechanisms according to foreign subsidiaries’ environmental and resource 
contingencies (e.g., Andersson and Forsgren, 1996; Chung et al., 2000; Gencturk and Aulakh, 
1995; Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989; Jaussaud and Schaaper, 2006; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994; 
O’Donnell, 2000; Yu, Wong and Chiao, 2006). While prior research offers valuable insights into 
control mechanisms used by headquarters for the management of foreign subsidiaries, the 
subsidiary board, as another control mechanism, has yet to be addressed in the literature.  
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 7 
 
Subsidiary Boards 
        Research on subsidiary boards is very limited. Among the few studies that examine 
subsidiary boards, Leksell and Lindgren (1982) identify external roles (advisory, external 
relations) as well as internal roles (control and monitoring, coordination and integration) that 
subsidiary boards play in MNEs. Kriger (1988) finds evidence of an increasing use of subsidiary 
boards over time. Moreover, Japanese MNEs use subsidiary boards more actively than either 
European or North American MNEs. Huse and Rindova (2001) find that stakeholders have 
different expectations with respect to the roles that subsidiary boards play in MNEs. Contrary to 
the aforementioned studies in which subsidiary boards are active, Gillies and Dickinson (1999) 
find that subsidiary boards are merely rubber stamps set up to fulfill local legal requirements. 
Björkman (1994) finds that most subsidiary boards perform limited tasks. However, in those 
boards that are active, strategy and budget approval is considered important. Recently, Kim, 
Prescott and Kim (2005) and Kiel, Hendry and Nicholson (2006) theoretically demonstrate that 
the structure of subsidiary boards should satisfy the differentiated roles of foreign subsidiaries in 
MNEs. Although these studies provide important insights, the conditions under which foreign 
subsidiaries maintain active boards have yet to be examined in the literature.  
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
        In this section, we use agency theory and resource dependence theory to develop hypotheses 
on the conditions under which foreign subsidiaries maintain active boards. These two theories 
provide complementary explanations on board roles. Moreover, they lead to different 
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 8 
implications for control mechanisms employed in MNEs. Therefore, these two theories may 
provide valuable insights into the presence of active boards in foreign subsidiaries.  
 
Agency Theory and Subsidiary Boards 
        According to agency theory, the headquarters-foreign subsidiary relation has a principal-
agent structure where headquarters is the principal and subsidiary management is the agent. 
Subsidiary management may have its own goals and risk preferences that differ from those of 
headquarters. When information asymmetries between headquarters and subsidiary management 
are high, it is difficult for headquarters to monitor the behavior of subsidiary management and 
employ behavioral control (Christie, Joye, Watts, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; 
O’Donnell, 2000; Roth and O’Donnell, 1996). To ensure that subsidiary-level decisions are in 
accordance with the overall strategy of the MNE, agency theory prescribes the use of outcome 
control such as incentive compensation. However, outcome control is not desirable if the 
performance outcomes of subsidiary management are uncertain or difficult to measure 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Additionally, cultural control may be desirable 
but it often entails high costs (Jager, 1983; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994; Stopford and Wells, 
1972). As an alternative control mechanism, an active board could be used for monitoring 
subsidiary management on behalf of headquarters. Moreover, an active board could reduce the 
information asymmetries by providing headquarters with information on the environmental and 
strategic complexities faced by the subsidiary (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
        The above discussion suggests that an MNE is more likely to maintain an active board when 
there are high information asymmetries between headquarters and subsidiary management, and 
the performance outcomes of subsidiary management are difficult to measure. In the 
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 9 
international business literature, two factors are considered critical to induce the information 
asymmetries and increase difficulties of measuring the performance outcomes of subsidiary 
management. The first factor is the world mandate subsidiary. The world mandate subsidiary has 
worldwide responsibility for a product line and performs a broad scope of value-added activities 
(e.g., R&D, production, and marketing). It typically works with headquarters to develop and 
implement corporate strategy (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995). As the world mandate 
subsidiary has a high level of specialized knowledge and expertise which could be used by other 
subsidiaries and the headquarters, the level of information asymmetry is high. Thus, from an 
agency theory perspective, the world mandate subsidiary presents difficulties for monitoring or 
verifying the behavior of subsidiary management (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Doz and Prahalad, 
1991; O’Donnell, 2000; Roth and Morrison, 1991; Roth and O’Donnell, 1996). Furthermore, the 
world mandate subsidiary operates in a strategically important market and performs complex 
tasks, making it difficult for the headquarters to measure the performance outcomes of subsidiary 
management. Accordingly, headquarters are likely to monitor the world mandate subsidiary 
through an active board. Thus, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1a. A foreign subsidiary is more likely to maintain an active board when it is a world 
mandate subsidiary. 
 
        The second factor is the relative size of a foreign subsidiary with respect to the MNE. 
International business studies show that the relative size of a foreign subsidiary represents the 
strategic importance of the subsidiary in the MNE (Boyacigiller, 1990; Chang and Taylor, 1999; 
Martinez and Ricks, 1989; Mudambi and Navarra, 2004). When a foreign subsidiary is larger 
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 10 
relative to the MNE, the strong strategic position of the subsidiary allows subsidiary 
management to obtain greater information and specialized knowledge that are important to the 
MNE’s operations (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Roth and 
Morrison, 1991). Therefore, there is a high level of information asymmetry between 
headquarters and the relatively large subsidiary, and it is difficult for the headquarters to monitor 
the behavior of subsidiary management. Furthermore, as the relatively large subsidiary often 
faces strategic complexities and uncertainties (Gencturk and Aulakh, 1995), it is difficult for the 
headquarters to specify the performance outcomes of the subsidiary in advance. In particular, 
outcome control shifting risk to subsidiary management is not appropriate for relatively large 
subsidiaries because subsidiary management’s decisions influence the overall performance of the 
MNE. Therefore, if a foreign subsidiary is large relative to the MNE, headquarters may monitor 
subsidiary management through an active board. Thus, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1b. A foreign subsidiary is more likely to maintain an active board when it is larger 
relative to the MNE. 
 
Resource Dependence Theory and Subsidiary Boards 
        According to resource dependence theory, firms depend on their external environment for 
survival, and they should alter their behavioral patterns to best acquire and maintain needed 
resources (Barney et al., 2001; Hillman et al., 2009; Lockett and Thompson, 2001; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). In the context of MNEs, the external environment of a foreign subsidiary 
consists of other actors inside and outside the MNE such as headquarters, customers, suppliers 
and other counterparts. As a foreign subsidiary becomes more dependent on its external 
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 11 
environment for key resources, it becomes more important for the subsidiary to maintain 
relations with the stakeholders who provide the resources. International business studies suggest 
that headquarters often adjust control mechanisms to facilitate subsidiaries accessing key 
resources (Andersson and Forsgren, 1996; Ghoshal and Nohria 1989; Nohria and Ghoshal 1994; 
Yu, Wong and Chiao, 2006). For example, Yu et al. (2006) find that headquarters uses less 
behavioral control when a foreign subsidiary has more local linkages. Andersson and Forsgren 
(1996) find that subsidiary managers perceive a lower level of control from headquarters when a 
foreign subsidiary is tightly embedded in the external network. Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) and 
Nohria and Ghoshal (1994) find that headquarters uses more cultural control such as corporate 
socialization when local resources are important to foreign subsidiaries. Besides altering control 
mechanisms, an active board could help the subsidiary access key resources by providing advice 
and counsel, building legitimacy and maintaining relations with important stakeholders (Hillman 
et al., 2009; Lockett and Thompson, 2001; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
        The above discussion suggests that an MNE is more likely to maintain an active board when 
a foreign subsidiary becomes more dependent on the external environment for key resources. 
Thus, factors that increase a foreign subsidiary’s dependence on other actors inside and outside 
of the MNE are important to understanding the presence of an active board. The first such factor 
is a foreign subsidiary’s local responsiveness. Local responsiveness describes the extent to which 
a foreign subsidiary adjusts its activities to the needs of local stakeholders (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1989; Doz and Prahalad, 1991; Luo, 2001; Morrison and Roth, 1992). Local responsiveness 
stems from the complexity and dynamism of local market conditions as well as of the 
sociopolitical and macroeconomic environment of the host country (Morrison and Roth, 1992). 
Subsidiaries with higher levels of local responsiveness are more dependent on local stakeholders 
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such as local customers, local suppliers, and local government for key resources. An active board 
could manage external relations with local stakeholders, provide advice on local conditions, and 
facilitate the access to local resources (Leksell and Lindgren, 1982; Kriger, 1988). Thus, we posit 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2a. A foreign subsidiary is more likely to maintain an active board when it has a 
higher level of local responsiveness. 
 
        The second factor is a foreign subsidiary’s past performance. The level of past performance 
influences the firm’s availability of financial slack and the survival of the firm (Pearce and 
Zahra, 1992; Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989). When a firm performs poorly, it is important 
to maintain good relations with main stakeholders and have the access to more resources. 
Outside directors could provide a fresh perspective, enhance the existing pool of expertise and 
assure the financial community that the firm’s operations are under control (Pearce and Zahra, 
1992). Accordingly, empirical studies on boards in standalone firms show that firms often add 
outside directors under poor past performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Daily, 1995; 
Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Similarly, in the context of MNEs, when a foreign subsidiary’s past 
performance is poor, it is dependent on headquarters and other actors in the external environment 
for key resources. An active board could help the subsidiary acquire and maintain needed 
resources by providing advice and counsel, building legitimacy and managing relations with 
important stakeholders (Hillman et al., 2009; Lockett and Thompson, 2001; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Thus, we posit the following hypothesis: 
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 13 
Hypothesis 2b. A foreign subsidiary is more likely to maintain an active board when its past 
performance is poorer. 
 
The Relation between Agency Theory and Resource Dependence Theory 
        Agency theory and resource dependence theory address different aspects of the roles of 
active boards in foreign subsidiaries. From an agency theory perspective, an active board could 
be used as an alternative control mechanism to monitor subsidiary management on behalf of 
headquarters. According to resource dependence theory, an active board could be used to deal 
with the external environment and gain critical resources. In the above paragraphs, we first use 
agency theory to develop two hypotheses that link world mandate subsidiary and relative size to 
active boards. We then use resource dependence theory to develop two hypotheses that link local 
responsiveness and past performance to active boards. It should be noted that in addition to 
resource dependence theory, agency theory could also explain the impact of local responsiveness 
and past performance on the presence of active boards. According to agency theory, a foreign 
subsidiary with a high level of local responsiveness often has more local information that is not 
available for the headquarters (Kim et al., 2005), and consequently, it is difficult for the 
headquarters to monitor the behavior of subsidiary management. Similarly, a foreign subsidiary’s 
poor past performance is an indication of poor management (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; 
Linck et al., 2008). An active board could be used to ensure that subsidiary managers make 
decisions in the best interests of headquarters and improve the subsidiary’s performance. On the 
other hand, in addition to agency theory, resource dependence theory also has implications for 
the impact of world mandate subsidiary and relative size on the presence of active boards. 
According to resource dependence theory, the world mandate subsidiary performs a broad scope 
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 14 
of value-added activities and needs to cope with the demands from many sectors of the external 
environment. Similarly, if a foreign subsidiary is large relative to the MNE, it plays an important 
role in the MNE in terms of seeking resources from the external environment. An active board 
could be used to reduce the subsidiary’s dependence on the external environment and secure key 
resources. In sum, agency theory and resource dependence theory are relevant and 
complementary in the analysis of active boards in foreign subsidiaries. 
 
RESEARCH SETTING AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
        Our sample consists of foreign subsidiaries operating in Belgium. By focusing on foreign 
subsidiaries in the same host country, we minimize the influence of host country institutional and 
cultural factors on the presence of active boards in foreign subsidiaries. The statistical office of 
the European Union reports that Belgium has a higher percentage of foreign investment inward 
flows than most European countries (Eurostat, 2010). According to Belgian Company Law, a 
foreign subsidiary must register as a separate legal entity. The most common legal forms are the 
Naamloze Vennootschap (NV) and the Besloten Vennootschap met Beperkte Aansprakelijkheid 
(BVBA). An NV is set up by at least two persons who contribute a fixed amount of capital in 
return for shares in the firm. An NV can issue bearer shares that are freely transferable. In 
contrast to an NV, a BVBA has a lower minimum capital requirement for establishment, while 
its shares are transferrable only under specific conditions. The board in an NV should be 
composed of at least three directors unless the firm has only two shareholders, in which case the 
board should be composed of two directors. A BVBA should have at least one director. Directors 
are held liable for any shortcomings during their management and for any loss resulting from 
Page 14 of 46
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 
 15 
infringement. Moreover, firms in Belgium have a one-tier board structure. No conditions of 
board tasks or composition are imposed on non-listed companies.  
        We begin by identifying our initial sample through the Bel-first database, using four criteria. 
First, each subsidiary is located in Belgium and has a global ultimate owner domiciled outside 
Belgium. The global ultimate owner defined by the Bel-first database is an independent firm 
located in another country and that owns at least 51 percent of the subsidiary’s shares. This 
criterion ensures that we select foreign subsidiaries operating in Belgium. Second, if an MNE has 
multiple subsidiaries registered in Belgium, we select only the largest subsidiary. We invoke this 
criterion because one MNE may use the subsidiary board in a similar way in its multiple 
subsidiaries. Third, we exclude subsidiaries with less than 50 employees because agency-based 
explanations may not be valid for smaller firms (Eisenberg et al., 1998)2. Finally, similar to 
previous studies (Bathala and Rao, 1995; Linck et al., 2008), we exclude subsidiaries operating 
in financial industries. Application of these criteria results in a sample of 420 foreign 
subsidiaries.  
        Next, we collect data using a survey distributed to the CEOs of target foreign subsidiaries. 
The names of the CEOs and their addresses were obtained from the Trends Top 2008 database, 
which provides financial and economic data on Belgian companies. If the name of a CEO was 
not available, we sent the questionnaire to another member of the top management team (CFO, 
chair of the subsidiary board, member of the subsidiary board). Additionally, we collect archival 
financial and governance data on these subsidiaries and their MNE headquarters. We designed 
the questionnaire following Dillman (2000) to improve its content validity. First, we constructed 
the initial questionnaire based on the existing instruments. Next, we pre-tested the questionnaire 
through five interviews with CEOs of foreign subsidiaries. Additionally, we asked five academic 
Page 15 of 46
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 
 16 
colleagues working in the field of accounting and finance to read the questionnaire. After making 
revisions, we designed an attractive layout for the questionnaire, printed them on good-quality 
paper, signed each cover letter, and distributed them together with pre-paid return envelops to the 
senior managers of target subsidiaries. The initial survey (conducted in December 2008) and 
three follow-ups yielded 87 (21%) returned questionnaires3. Four responses are discarded due to 
large numbers of missing values, which results in a sample of 83 responses used to test our 
hypotheses. The response rate is similar to those reported in previous studies (Birkinshaw and 
Morrison, 1995; Chang and Taylor, 1999; Roth and O’Donnell, 1996).  
        Before using the final sample to test our hypotheses, we verify the suitability of the sample 
for our analysis. First, we check non-response bias by comparing the absolute size and industry 
representation of our respondent subsidiaries with those of the target subsidiaries. The t-test 
shows that the absolute size of our respondent subsidiaries is not significantly different from the 
target subsidiaries (t=0.98, p=0.33). The chi-square test indicates that the industry representation 
of our sample is not significantly different from the target subsidiaries (chi-square=37.05, 
p=0.69). Next, we compare whether the answers from earlier respondents differ from those of 
later respondents on all variables and the demographic characteristics of the respondents. The 
results show no significant differences between early and late respondents. In sum, our data does 
not appear to suffer from non-response bias. Finally, we check whether the answers from CEOs 
differ from those of other management positions (chair of the subsidiary board, financial director 
or other member of the subsidiary board) on all variables and we find no significant differences, 
indicating that the answers are unlikely to be biased due to the different respondents functions 
(with respect to the presence of active boards: Likelihood-ratio chi-square=0.42, p=0.52). 
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 17 
MEASURES 
 
Dependent Variable 
        Active Board. Active board is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a foreign subsidiary has an 
active board and zero otherwise. To identify whether a subsidiary board is active, we ask 
respondents whether there is a board of directors in their foreign subsidiaries. If they answer 
“yes,” we ask them to rate the extent to which the board performs a list of 21 tasks from -3 (not 
at all) to +3 (to a great extent). This list, consisting of all possible tasks performed by an active 
board, is presented in Appendix A. We develop this list based on Kriger (1988) and Wan and 
Ong (2005). Among these board tasks, the first 15 tasks are related to control and coordination in 
the MNE, while the remaining 6 tasks are related to advisory and service on the external 
environment. We consider a foreign subsidiary to maintain an active board if it satisfies two 
conditions: first, there is a board of directors in the foreign subsidiary; second, the board 
performs at least one of the 21 tasks (rated higher than -3). As Belgian Company Law requires 
all firms to have a board, if respondents answer that there is no board in their foreign 
subsidiaries, their subsidiary boards are actually rubber stamps (inactive). Therefore, we consider 
a board to be a rubber stamp (inactive) either when it is reported that there is no board in the 
foreign subsidiary, or that the board does not perform any of the 21 tasks (all rated at -3). 
 
Independent Variables 
        World mandate. Based on Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995), we ask respondents whether 
the subsidiary currently sells finished products/services outside Belgium. If they answer “yes,” 
we ask them to identify whether the subsidiary is a world mandate subsidiary. The definition of 
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 18 
world mandate subsidiary is given in the questionnaire. In this study, world mandate subsidiary 
is a dummy variable (world mandate) equal to 1 if the respondent reports that the subsidiary is a 
world mandate subsidiary and zero otherwise. To test the validity of this measure, we ask 
respondents whether the subsidiary performs any of the following activities: manufacturing, 
marketing/retail, R&D, purchase and supply, business services. The literature shows that world 
mandate subsidiaries are responsible for a broad scope of value-added activities (Ambos and 
Schlegelmilch, 2007; Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995; Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989; Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1991; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994). Consistently, we find that our world mandate 
subsidiaries perform significantly more activities than the rest of the subsidiaries in our sample 
(t=-6.58, p<0.0001), which demonstrates the validity of our measure.  
        Relative size. Relative size is measured by the foreign subsidiary’s total number of 
employees at the end of 2008, divided by the MNE’s total number of employees. The foreign 
subsidiary’s total number of employees is obtained from the Bel-first database. The MNE’s total 
number of employees is obtained from the annual reports of non-European MNEs and from the 
Amadeus database for European MNEs. 
        Local Responsiveness. Local responsiveness is measured using a seven-point Likert-scale 
ranging from -3 (not at all) to +3 (to a great extent). We ask respondents the extent to which the 
subsidiary adapts activities to the needs of the Belgian market. The literature shows that 
subsidiaries with sales only in the host country have higher levels of local responsiveness 
(Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995; Yu et al., 2006). Consistently, we find that local 
responsiveness is significantly higher for those subsidiaries that have sales only in Belgium 
(t=4.20, p<0.0001), which demonstrates the validity of this measure. 
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 19 
        Past performance. Similar to previous studies (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Linck et al., 2008), 
we measure a foreign subsidiary’s past performance by its average annual Return on Equity in 
2005, 2006, and 2007, obtained from the Bel-first database. 
 
Control Variables 
        We include absolute size, headquarters country, geographical distance and cultural distance 
as control variables based on prior research. Additionally, we control for the effect of other 
control mechanisms exerted by headquarters on the presence of active boards by including 
CEO’s headquarters management position, the use of expatriate managers and corporate 
socialization. 
        Absolute size. Firm size represents the scope and complexity of the firm’s operations 
(Boone et al., 2007; Lehn et al., 2009; Linck et al., 2008). Previous studies show that larger firms 
have more need for board monitoring and building external linkages (Boone et al., 2007; Boyd, 
1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Lehn et al., 2009; Linck et al., 2008; Mak and Li, 2001; 
Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Accordingly, a larger subsidiary is more likely to maintain an active 
board. Therefore, we control for the absolute size of foreign subsidiaries, which is measured via 
the subsidiary’s total number of employees at the end of 2008, obtained from the Bel-first 
database. 
        Headquarters country. Prior research indicates that the nationality of an MNE influences 
the type of control mechanisms headquarters exerts over its foreign subsidiaries and the roles of 
subsidiary boards (Chang and Taylor, 1999; Chow, Shields and Wu, 1999; Chung et al., 2000; 
Egelhoff, 1984; Kriger, 1988). Therefore, we control for headquarters country by a dummy 
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 20 
variable (Anglo-Saxon) equal to 1 if the subsidiary has a headquarters in an Anglo-Saxon 
country, obtained from the Bel-first database4. 
        Geographical distance. Geographical distance increases the difficulties for headquarters to 
obtain complete and accurate information and to control foreign subsidiaries. Thus, MNEs are 
more likely to maintain active boards in geographically dispersed foreign subsidiaries to control 
subsidiary management. In this study, geographical distance is measured by the 1,000 kilometers 
distance between the capital cities of headquarters country and host country. 
        Cultural distance. Similar to geographical distance, cultural distance also increases the 
difficulties for headquarters to obtain complete and accurate information and to control foreign 
subsidiaries (Gong, 2003; Roth and O’Donnell, 1996). An active board can monitor subsidiary 
management on behalf of headquarters. Moreover, an active board could provide advice and 
counsel on the local culture and environment. Cultural distance is calculated via the formula 
developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) and used in several studies (Chang and Taylor, 1999; Roth 
and O’Donnell, 1996). We use the scores on four culture dimensions of Hofstede and Hofstede 
(2005): power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualisms, and masculinity.  
        Other control mechanisms. As an active board could be a control mechanism for 
managing foreign subsidiaries as well as an instrument for dealing with the external 
environment, there may be a substitution or complementary effect between the presence of an 
active board and other control mechanisms. Previous studies show that MNEs often transfer 
managers from headquarters to their foreign subsidiaries (Boyacigiller, 1990; Chung et al., 2006; 
Gaur, Delios and Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003; Tan and Maloney, 2006). Moreover, headquarters 
often rely on corporate socialization to integrate foreign subsidiaries into MNEs (Chalos and 
O’Connor, 2004; Chung et al., 2000, 2006; O’Donnell, 2000). Accordingly, in this study, we 
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 21 
include three control mechanisms, namely CEO’s headquarters management position, the use of 
expatriate managers and corporate socialization. CEO’s headquarters management position is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a subsidiary CEO holds a management position at the MNE 
headquarters, obtained from the questionnaire. The use of expatriate managers is measured by a 
dummy variable (expatriate) equal to 1 if the subsidiary CEO is the headquarters country 
national, obtained from the questionnaire. Corporate socialization is measured by three items in 
the questionnaire based on Chalos and O’Connor (2004) and O’Donnell (2000), using a seven-
point Likert-scale ranging from -3 (not at all) to +3 (to a great extent). We ask respondents the 
extent to which headquarters visits the subsidiary frequently, organizes international training 
programs, and attaches a strong corporate culture to subsidiaries.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
…Insert Table 1 around here… 
 
        Table 1 presents the headquarters country and the legal form of the subsidiaries in our 
sample, along with respondent tenure. The headquarters of our sample subsidiaries are located in 
14 different countries, mainly in the U.S. (18 subsidiaries), France (18 subsidiaries), and the 
Netherlands (13 subsidiaries). The majority of sample subsidiaries have the legal form of NV (73 
subsidiaries). On average, respondents have been working approximately eight years in their 
subsidiaries. Additionally, our sample subsidiaries operate across 25 two-digit standard industrial 
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classification codes, with some concentration in chemicals (8 subsidiaries) and wholesale trade-
durable goods (10 subsidiaries). None of the sample subsidiaries are listed on a stock market. On 
average, the boards in our sample perform 12 tasks out of the 21 total tasks. Appendix B presents 
the number and percentage of our sample subsidiaries performing each of the 21 board tasks 
(rated higher than -3). The boards in our sample emphasize more monitoring related tasks than 
service related tasks. 
        In our sample, the respondents from 23 foreign subsidiaries answer that there is no board in 
their subsidiaries. As Belgian Company Law requires all firms to have a board, we consider 
these boards to be rubber stamps (inactive). Among the remainder 60 subsidiaries that have a 
board, three perform none of the 21 board tasks (all rated at “-3”). Since an active board 
performs at least one of the 21 board tasks, we consider the three boards to be rubber stamps 
(inactive) as well.  
 
…Insert Table 2 around here… 
 
        Table 2 Panel A presents the mean, standard deviation, and spearman correlations for all 
variables used in the main analysis. As expected, the presence of an active board is positively 
correlated with absolute size, relative size and cultural distance. To check for multicollinearity, 
Table 2 Panel B reports the variance inflation factors (VIF) of our explanatory variables. All VIF 
scores are below 2, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem.  
 
Hypothesis Tests 
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 23 
…Insert Table 3 around here… 
 
        To test our hypotheses, we estimate logistic regressions with the dummy variable active 
board as the dependent variable. Logistic regression analysis is often used to describe the 
relationship between a binary or dichotomous outcome variable and one or more explanatory 
variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). We use three different methods as reported in Table 3. 
In Model 1, we estimate robust standard errors to correct for possible heteroskedasticity (Huber, 
1967; White, 1980). In Model 2, we estimate robust standard errors clustered by 14 headquarters 
countries to adjust for the potential correlations between foreign subsidiaries headquartered in 
the same country (Petersen, 2009; Wooldridge, 2003). In Model 3, we estimate robust standard 
errors clustered by 23 industries to adjust for the potential correlations between foreign 
subsidiaries operating in the same industry (Petersen, 2009; Wooldridge, 2003)5. 
As shown in Table 3, all logit models are significant. Overall, our logit models correctly 
predict 84.34% of cases. Hypothesis 1a posits a positive relation between world mandate 
subsidiary and the presence of an active board, which is supported. Our results also provide 
strong support for Hypothesis 1b, which posits a positive relation between a subsidiary’s size 
relative to the MNE and the presence of an active board. Hypothesis 2a predicting a positive 
relation between a subsidiary’s local responsiveness and the presence of an active board is 
supported as well. Finally, we find a significant negative relation between a subsidiary’s past 
performance and the presence of an active board, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2b.  
With regard to control variables, first, a foreign subsidiary is less likely to maintain an 
active board if the subsidiary has its headquarters in an Anglo-Saxon country6. This is parallel to 
Kriger (1988) who reports that North American MNEs view subsidiary boards as less useful 
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mechanisms, compared to European and Japanese MNEs. One possible explanation could be that 
Anglo-Saxon MNEs focus more on short-term performance and use more outcome control 
(Chang and Taylor, 1999; Chow, Shields and Wu, 1999; Chung et al., 2000; Egelhoff, 1984), 
which decreases the need for active boards. Second, a foreign subsidiary is less likely to maintain 
an active board if the subsidiary CEO holds a management position at the MNE headquarters, 
indicating that there is a substitution effect between CEO’s headquarters management position 
and the presence of an active board. Third, a foreign subsidiary is more likely to maintain an 
active board if it is more culturally distant from headquarters (supported by all the models) and if 
it is more geographically distant from headquarters (supported by Model 1 and Model 3). 
Finally, Model 2 suggests that if a subsidiary CEO is a headquarters country national, the 
subsidiary is more likely to maintain an active board. One possible explanation could be that the 
headquarters country national has less understanding on local conditions. Therefore, if a 
subsidiary CEO is a headquarters country national, an active board may help the subsidiary CEO 
build connections with local stakeholders and access local resources.  
 
Robustness Checks 
 
        …Insert Table 4 around here… 
 
        We conduct several robustness checks examining the presence of active boards in foreign 
subsidiaries. The results are reported in Table 47. First, we use an alternative measure of active 
board. We consider a foreign subsidiary to maintain an active board if there is a board in the 
foreign subsidiary that performs at least five of the 21 tasks8. This measure results in 54 active 
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boards. The results are reported in Model 4. Second, we use an alternative measure of past 
performance. We measure a foreign subsidiary’s past performance by its average annual Return 
on Assets in 2005, 2006, and 2007, obtained from the Bel-first database9. The results are reported 
in Model 5. Third, we use the culture index of the World Value Survey 2005/2006 to recalculate 
cultural distance according to the formula developed by Kogut and Singh (1988). The World 
Value Survey is an ongoing academic project by social scientists to assess the state of socio-
cultural, moral, religious and political values of various cultures around the world (available 
online at www.worldvaluessurvey.org). The survey measures all major areas of human concerns 
along two dimensions: traditional vs. secular-rational values, and survival vs. self-expression 
values (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The results are reported in Model 6. Finally, we measure 
the use of expatriate managers by a seven-point Likert-scale ranging from -3 (not at all) to +3 (to 
a great extent). In the questionnaire, we ask respondents the extent to which headquarters use 
expatriate managers to directly control the subsidiary’s operations. The results are reported in 
Model 7. As shown in Table 4, the results from all the models support Hypothesis 1a, Hypothesis 
1b, and Hypothesis 2a, and marginally support Hypothesis 2b. The results with respect to 
significant control variables are consistent with our main anal sis reported in Table 3. However, 
the coefficient of expatiate is not significant if we use the alternative measure of expatriate, 
indicating that if the expatriate manager is not the subsidiary CEO, there is no effect on the 
presence of an active board. Additionally, we measure relative size using a foreign subsidiary’s 
sales (or total assets) divided by corporate total sales (or total assets), and we measure absolute 
size via a foreign subsidiary’s sales (or total assets). The results of these tests (untabulated) are 
similar to those reported in our main analysis. 
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        …Insert Table 5 around here… 
 
        Next, we conduct several additional analyses examining the degree of board activeness, 
instead of the presence of active boards. Table 5 reports the results. The degree of board 
activeness is measured in two ways. In Model 8, we measure the degree of board activeness by 
summing and averaging the standard scores of the 21 board tasks (Mean=-0.69; Std. Dev. =1.75; 
Cronbach’s alpha=0.92). OLS robust regression is used. In Model 9, we measure the degree of 
board activeness by the percentage of tasks the board performs (Mean=0.59; Std. Dev. =0.44). 
As the dependent variable is a proportion bounded between 0 and 1 (including 0 and 1), 
fractional logistic regression is appropriate (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). Both models support 
Hypothesis 2a (at the significance level of 0.10). However, the rest of the hypotheses are not 
supported. These results indicate that the factor that influences the presence of an active board in 
a foreign subsidiary may not have an impact on the degree of board activeness. This may be due 
to the conflict between different board tasks, which reduces the total variance of the degree of 
board activeness. Leksell and Lindgren (1982) suggest that there is a conflict between external 
roles (advisory, external relations) and internal roles (control and monitoring, coordination and 
integration). When performing internal roles, the subsidiary board needs information about 
corporate policies and procedures and about the management and allocation of internal 
resources, while part of this information is not always deemed suitable to disclose to outside 
directors who are residents of the host country (Leksell and Lindgren, 1982)10.  
Finally, prior research suggests that ownership structure, CEO tenure, firm age and legal 
form influence the role and composition of boards in standalone firms (Björkman, 1994; Boone 
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et al., 2007; Lehn et al., 2009; Linck et al., 2008). Moreover, incentive compensation as an 
important control mechanism may have a substitution or complementary effect on the presence 
of an active board. Therefore, we include these variables as control variables11. Similar to our 
main analysis, we estimate logistic regressions using three different methods. The results 
(untabulated) with respect to our hypothesized relations and significant control variables are 
consistent with our main analysis reported in Table 3. However, ownership structure, CEO 
tenure, firm age, legal form and incentive compensation are not significant in any logit model.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
        With the increasing rate of globalization and rapidly intensifying competition, an important 
challenge facing MNEs is the successful management of foreign subsidiaries. The literature has 
concentrated on boards in standalone firms, codes of good governance in a given country and 
control mechanisms in MNEs. However, very little is known about the role of subsidiary boards 
in the governance of foreign subsidiaries. Motivated by these observations, this study examines 
the conditions under which a foreign subsidiary maintains an active board. Using survey and 
archival data from 83 foreign subsidiaries operating in Belgium with headquarters in 14 different 
countries, we find that a foreign subsidiary is more likely to maintain an active board if it is a 
world mandate subsidiary, if it is larger relative to the MNE, if it has a higher level of local 
responsiveness, and if its past performance is poorer. Further, the presence of an active board in 
a foreign subsidiary is related to other control mechanisms deployed in the subsidiary. In 
particular, a foreign subsidiary is less likely to maintain an active board if the subsidiary CEO 
holds a management position at the MNE headquarters. 
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        This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, while prior research focuses on 
various types of control mechanisms in MNEs, our study provides insight into the conditions 
under which an active board is more likely to be present. Our results suggest that a MNE’s 
decision to maintain an active board in a foreign subsidiary seems to relate to the agency 
problem between headquarters and subsidiary management and the dependence of the subsidiary 
on the external environment. Therefore, an active board could be used as a control mechanism 
for managing foreign subsidiaries, as well as an instrument for dealing with the external 
environment. Second, while most prior research uses only a single theory to explain board 
characteristics, our findings suggest that a combination of agency theory and resource 
dependence theory provides comprehensive explanations on the presence of active boards. 
        This study yields implications for top managers of MNEs. First, our results suggest that an 
active board might be of strategic importance to enhance subsidiary governance. Thus, top 
managers may consider maintaining an active board to govern foreign subsidiaries, as well as to 
deal with local issues. Moreover, in order to delegate appropriate tasks to an active board, it is 
important to analyze and evaluate the specific knowledge and resources of the subsidiary and the 
external environment. Second, top managers may face a tradeoff between assigning monitoring 
tasks and assigning service tasks to an active board due to the conflict between different board 
roles. Finally, the results from our control variables indicate that the presence of an active board 
in a foreign subsidiary is related to other control mechanisms deployed in the subsidiary. 
Therefore, top managers may consider the costs and benefits of different control mechanisms 
when delegating an active board in foreign subsidiaries.  
        This study also yields implications for policy makers. Corporate governance regulators have 
developed different codes of good governance at the country level, which provide best practice 
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recommendations and regulate the behavior and structure of boards of directors (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 2009). However, there are few governance recommendations that deal 
with corporate governance issues in MNEs. The MNE represents a complex organization with 
headquarters in one country and operating across many countries. This study shows that an 
active board may be an important internal governance mechanism for managing foreign 
subsidiaries, as well as an instrument for dealing with the external environment. Therefore, 
corporate governance regulators may consider developing governance recommendations that 
emphasize the importance of subsidiary boards in the oversight of foreign subsidiaries.  
        This study has some limitations. First, it only provides evidence on foreign subsidiaries 
operating in Belgium, where there are few restrictions on governance structures and the conduct 
of business (see Doing Business Survey, 2010). The findings of this study may not be generalized 
to subsidiaries operating in significantly different institutional settings. Second, as we select the 
largest subsidiary of those MNEs that have more than one subsidiary operating in Belgium, our 
results represent only the practices of the largest subsidiaries. Third, as our data are cross-
sectional, we could not test causality in the model. Longitudinal research on subsidiary boards 
could further extend the findings of this study. Finally, our sample size is quite small, which 
might limit our ability to identify statistically significant relationships. 
        Despite the limitations, this study opens opportunities for future research. First, while this 
study provides evidence on the conditions under which subsidiary boards are active, future 
research is needed to investigate how headquarters delegate different roles to active boards 
according to the environmental and strategic contingencies faced by foreign subsidiaries. 
Second, this study is based on majority owned and wholly owned foreign subsidiaries. In these 
subsidiaries, headquarters are able to rely on their ownership position to decide whether their 
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foreign subsidiaries maintain active boards. Future research could extend this study to other 
forms of subsidiaries such as joint ventures. Third, this study is based on foreign subsidiaries 
operating in Belgium, where boards have a one-tier structure. Future research could extend our 
understanding of subsidiary governance by investigating the role and structure of subsidiary 
boards based on subsidiaries operating in other countries where boards have a two-tier structure. 
Finally, while this study provides some evidence that the presence of an active board in a foreign 
subsidiary is related to other control mechanisms deployed in the subsidiary, future research 
could further explore this issue by testing the substitutability and complementarity of different 
governance mechanisms for managing foreign subsidiaries. 
 
NOTES 
1. Foreign subsidiaries are legally separate entities that are majority owned by headquarters and 
operating outside headquarters countries. We focus on boards in foreign subsidiaries because 
MNEs are exposed to more control problems for their foreign subsidiaries than for their domestic 
subsidiaries. Moreover, compared with local companies of host countries, it is more difficult for 
foreign subsidiaries to build connections with local stakeholders and access local resources.  
 
2. According to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003, “a very small 
enterprise is an enterprise that employs fewer than 10 persons and whose annual turnover and/or 
annual balance sheet total does not exceed EUR 2 million”. “A small enterprise is an enterprise 
which employs between 10 and 49 persons whose annual turnover and /or annual balance sheet 
total does not exceed EUR 10 million”. 
 
3. In the questionnaire design stage, we use various methods to control for common method 
biases, based on the suggestions of Podsakoff et al. (2003). First, we obtain our dependent 
variable (active board) and explanatory variables from different sources, which eliminates the 
tendency of the respondents to respond in a lenient manner. Second, we did not ask the 
respondents directly whether there is an active board in their subsidiaries. Instead, we asked the 
respondents to rate a list of 21 board tasks. This list is developed based on the existing 
instrument (Kriger, 1988; Wan and Ong, 2005) and none of the 21 items tasks is likely to reflect 
socially desirable behavior. Third, in the cover letter of the questionnaire, we promise the 
respondents that they are assured of complete confidentiality and their answers to the 
questionnaire will only be used for our research. There are no right and wrong answers and they 
should answer as honestly as possible. Applying these methods reduces the likelihood that our 
respondents conform to socially desirable standards and provide biased answers.  
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4. Prior research also shows that Japanese MNEs use subsidiary boards more actively than either 
European or North American MNEs (Kriger, 1988). Moreover, Japanese MNEs use control 
mechanisms in a different way than other MNEs. For example, Change and Taylor (1999) find 
that Japanese MNEs use more staffing control than their American counterparts do. In our 
sample, we only have five Japanese subsidiaries, all of which maintain an active board. 
Therefore, we could not add a dummy variable to control for the influence of Japanese MNEs on 
the presence of active boards. However, when we delete the five Japanese subsidiaries and re-
estimate our models, the results are similar to those reported in the main analysis. 
 
5. We also included industrial dummies in Model 1 and Model 2. We grouped our sample into 
five broad industrial sectors: manufacturing (SIC 20-39), trading (SIC 50-59), service (SIC 70-
89), transportation (SIC 40-49), and construction (SIC 15-17). The results suggest that industrial 
sectors are not significantly related to the presence of active boards. As adding too many 
independent variables decreases the power of the test, we delete these dummies from our 
analysis.  
 
6. Since there is a predominance of headquarters from the US, the Netherlands and France, we 
included the Netherlands dummy and the France dummy in our models, in addition to the Anglo-
Saxon dummy. The results show that subsidiaries headquartered in the Netherlands or France are 
not significantly different from the rest of subsidiaries in determining the presence of active 
boards (Netherlands: β=-0.85, p=0.59; France: β=1.14, p=0.71). As adding too many 
independent variables decreases the power of the test, we delete these dummies from our 
analysis. 
 
7. Similar to our main analysis, we estimate the logit models using three different methods 
(robust standard errors, robust standard errors clustered by headquarters countries, robust 
standard errors clustered by industries). The results using these methods are similar. Therefore, 
we only report the results using robust standard errors estimation in Table 4.  
 
8. We also consider an active board if there is a board in the foreign subsidiary that performs at 
least three of the 21 board tasks. The results with respect to our hypothesized relations and 
control variables are consistent with our main analysis reported in Table 3. 
 
9. Note that MNEs may shift a significant proportion of their incomes into low statutory tax rates 
host countries to reduce their overall tax liabilities (Collins et al., 1998; Rego, 2003). This may 
reduce the quality of accounting figures of foreign subsidiaries Further, financial reporting in 
Belgium suffers from tax bias, as there is a strong link between the accounting profit and the 
taxable profit of a company.  
 
10. We also conduct a number of complementary analyses using the extent to which boards 
perform monitoring tasks, and the extent to which boards perform service tasks as dependent 
variables respectively. Consistent with the agency theory prediction, we find that world mandate 
and relative size are significantly related to monitoring tasks (world mandate: β=0.70, p<0.001; 
relative size: β=0.23, p<0.001), but not significant to service tasks. This indicates that the 
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insignificant relation between subsidiary’s importance to the MNE and the degree of board 
activeness may be due to the conflict between different board roles. 
 
11. In theses analyses, ownership structure is measured using a dummy variable (wholly owned) 
equal to 1 if a foreign subsidiary is wholly owned by the MNE. CEO tenure is measured by the 
number of years that the subsidiary CEO has worked in the CEO position, obtained from the 
questionnaire. Subsidiary age is measured by the number of years the subsidiary is 
established/acquired by the headquarters. Legal form is measured using a dummy variable (NV) 
equal to 1 if the subsidiary’s legal form is N.V. Incentive compensation is measured by four 
items in the questionnaire, using a seven-point Likert-scale ranging from -3 (not at all) to +3 (to a 
great extent), based on the Chow et al. (1999). We asked respondents to indicate the extent to 
which their headquarters compensate subsidiary CEOs based on their performance relative to 
their budget. 
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TABLE 1 
 
Sample Subsidiaries by Headquarters Country, Legal Form and Respondent’s Tenure 
(N=83) 
 
 
n % 
Panel A: Headquarters country 
  
Australia   1   1.20 
Switzerland   4   4.82 
Germany   8   9.64 
Denmark   2   2.41 
France 18 21.68 
U.K.   4   4.82 
Ireland   2   2.44 
Italy   1   1.20 
Japan   5   6.02 
Luxemburg   4   4.82 
Netherland 13 15.66 
Norway   1   1.20 
Sweden   2   2.41 
U.S. 18 21.68 
Panel B: legal form 
  
NV 73 87.95 
BVBA 10 12.05 
Panel C: respondent’s tenure 
  
1-10 years  63 75.90 
11-20 years 15 18.07 
more than 20 years   5   6.03 
Average   8.45  
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TABLE 2 
 
Panel A: Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations of Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables (N=83) 
 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Active board     .69     .47 1.00            
2. World mandate     .28     .45   .19† 1.00           
3. Relative size     .04     .08   .28**   .02 1.00          
4. Local responsiveness   1.08   2.05   .15 -.31** -.02 1.00         
5. Past performance 22.80 53.77 -.17 -.04 -.03 -.02 1.00        
6. Absolute size   2.29     .44   .22*   .17   .40**   .07 -.07 1.00       
7. Anglo-Saxon     .30     .46 -.12   .24*   .10 -.28* -.08   .01 1.00      
8. Geographical distance   2.41   3.42   .05   .10   .02 -.15 -.13 -.08   .58*** 1.00     
9. Cultural distance     .33     .28   .21*   .22*  -.02 -.10   .04   .06   .23*   .11 1.00    
10. CEO’s headquarters 
management position 
    .19     .40  -.13   .38**   .11 -.11   .01   .04   .15   .10 -.01 1.00   
11.Expatriate     .28     .45   .01 -.02  -.12 -.15   .07  -.06   .06 -.01 -.09 -.17 1.00  
12.Socialization     .81   1.35 -.05   .04   .06   .15   .04   .06   .01   .06 -.02   .23*   .02 1.00 
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Panel B: Variance Inflation Factors (N=83) 
 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
World mandate  1.42 .70 
Relative size 1.17 .85 
Local responsiveness 1.29 .78 
Past performance 1.15 .87 
Absolute size 1.25 .80 
Anglo-Saxon 1.69 .59 
Geographical distance 1.55 .65 
Cultural distance 1.25 .80 
CEO’s headquarters management 
position  1.29 .78 
Expatriate 1.13 .89 
Socialization 1.21 .83 
 
Notes: (1) Significance level: †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed test). (2) In the above two tables, 
Active board is a dummy variable equal to one if a foreign subsidiary has an active board. World mandate is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the respondent defines the subsidiary as a world mandate in the questionnaire. 
Relative size is measured by the foreign subsidiary’s total number of employees at the end of 2008, divided by the 
MNE’s total number of employees. Local responsiveness is measured by a Likert-scale question asking the 
respondents the extent to which the subsidiary adapts its activities to the needs of the Belgian market. Past 
performance is the average annual ROE over 2005-2007. Absolute size is the logarithm of the total number of the 
subsidiary’s employees. Anglo-Saxon is a dummy variable equal to one if the subsidiary is headquartered in an 
Anglo-Saxon country. Geographical distance is the 1,000 kilometers distance between the capital cities of 
headquarters country and host country. Cultural distance is calculated using the procedure developed by Kogut and 
Singh (1988). CEO’s headquarters management positions is a dummy variable equal to one if the subsidiary CEO 
holds a management position at the MNE headquarters. Expatriate is measured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the subsidiary CEO is the headquarters country national. Socialization is measured by three items based on Chalos 
and O’Connor (2004) and O’Donnell (2000), using a seven-point Likert-scale ranging from -3 (not at all) to +3 (to a 
great extent). We ask respondents the extent to which headquarters visits the subsidiary frequently, organizes 
international training programs, and attaches a strong corporate culture to subsidiaries. 
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TABLE 3 
 
Logistic Regressions Explaining the Presence of Active Boards in Foreign Subsidiaries 
(N=83) 
 
Main research variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
World mandate           3.21** 
     (2.78) 
          2.53*** 
    (3.19) 
        3.21** 
     (2.61) 
Relative size           3.82*** 
     (3.38) 
         3.05*** 
    (3.18) 
          3.82*** 
    (4.22) 
Local responsiveness          1.27** 
      (3.04) 
        1.33** 
    (2.68) 
          1.27*** 
     (3.38) 
Past performance         -.82* 
     (-1.99) 
      -.53* 
   (-2.37) 
       -.82† 
    (-1.82) 
Other variables    
Absolute size       .52 
      (.89) 
     .37 
 ( 1.60) 
     .52 
     (.88) 
Anglo-Saxon         -3.15*** 
   (-3.19)  
        -3.15*** 
  (-3.63) 
Geographical distance         .65* 
     (2.23) 
     .01 
     (.02) 
       .65* 
   (2.01) 
Cultural distance          1.03** 
     (2.76) 
            .69*** 
    (3.93) 
       1.03** 
    (2.76) 
CEO’s headquarters management position       -2.34* 
    (-2.40) 
     -2.00* 
   (-2.12) 
        -2.34*** 
   (-3.43) 
Expatriate       1.23 
     (1.49) 
          1.10*** 
    (3.26) 
    1.23 
    (1.33) 
Socialization       -.51 
    (-1.44) 
      -.59† 
    (-1.80) 
    -.51 
   (-1.25) 
“Pseudo” R2        .43       .34       .43 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -29.38   -33.94 -29.38 
Wald Chi-square         28.15      2936.59  48.58 
P-value      .00        .00      .00 
 
Notes: (1) Significance level: †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed test).  (2) Model 1 estimates robust 
standard errors using Huber-White standard estimation. Model 2 estimates robust standard errors clustered by 14 
headquarters countries. Model 3 estimates robust standard errors clustered by 23 industries. (3) Standardized 
regression coefficients are reported. (4) Z-scores are reported in parentheses. (5) Please see Table 2 for variable 
definitions. 
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TABLE 4 
 
Logistic Regressions Explaining the Presence of Active Boards in Foreign Subsidiaries 
(Robustness checks, N=83) 
 
Main research variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
World mandate     2.06* 
  (2.06) 
   3.21**             
  (2.91) 
3.12**  
  (2.74) 
   3.34** 
  (3.09) 
Relative size    3.33** 
  (3.13) 
   3.38*** 
  (3.28)           
   3.46*** 
  (3.40) 
   3.90***  
  (3.23)                                            
Local responsiveness      .99**  
  (2.79) 
   1.27*** 
  (3.26) 
   1.07**  
  (2.97) 
  1.24** 
 (2.78) 
Past performance     -.62† 
 (-1.78) 
    -.44†      
 (-1.76) 
   -.75†  
(-1.83) 
   -.80†  
(-1.79) 
Other variables     
Absolute size      .40   
    (.94) 
     .59  
  (1.08)          
     .52 
    (.79) 
     .35  
    (.60) 
Anglo-Saxon   -2.69** 
 (-2.87) 
  -2.84*** 
 (-3.39) 
  -3.45**  
 (-3.13) 
  -3.70** 
 (-3.06) 
Geographical distance      .59*  
  (2.06) 
     .76**  
  (2.67)                                               
     .32  
    (.81)
     .90*  
  (2.35)
Cultural distance      .84*  
  (2.39) 
   1.01** 
  (2.60) 
   1.24*  
  (2.43) 
     .98* 
  (2.30) 
CEO’s headquarters management position   -2.13*  
 (-2.16) 
  -2.57*  
 (-2.43) 
  -2.11*  
 (-2.29) 
  -2.57**  
 (-2.62) 
Expatriate       .77  
  (1.10) 
   1.02 
  (1.32) 
   1.55† 
  (1.79) 
     .48  
 (1.44) 
Socialization     -.37  
 (-1.07) 
    -.55†  
 (-1.68) 
    -.61  
 (-1.61) 
   -.63  
(-1.59) 
“Pseudo” R2       .36       .42       .42      .42 
Log Pseudolikelihood -34.03 -29.87  -29.90 -29.85 
Wald Chi-square  21.95  28.94   27.25  19.80 
P-value      .02      .00       .00      .05 
 
Notes: (1) Significance level: †p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (two-tailed test). (2) Model 4 uses an 
alternative measure of the presence of active boards. We consider a foreign subsidiary to maintain an active board if 
there is a board in the foreign subsidiary that performs at least five of the 21 tasks. Model 5 uses an alternative 
measure of past performance based on the average annual ROA over 2005-2007. Model 6 uses an alternative 
measure of cultural distance based on the culture index of the World Value Survey 2005/2006. Model 7 uses an 
alternative measure of expatriate, which is a seven-point Likert-scale ranging from -3 (not at all) to +3 (to a great 
extent), obtained from the questionnaire. (3) Standardized regression coefficients are reported. (4) Z-scores are 
reported in parentheses. (5) Please see Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 5 
 
Regressions Explaining the Degree of Board Activeness in Foreign Subsidiaries  
(Additional analyses, N=83) 
 
Main research variables Model 8 Model 9 
 
Robust regression Fractional logit 
regression 
World mandate  .22 (.74) 
.62 
             (1.05) 
Relative size .11 
            (1.14) 
.28 
(.94) 
Local responsiveness .23† 
            (1.95) 
 .46† 
            (1.90) 
Past performance               -.09 
             (-.97) 
              -.14 
            (-.71) 
Other variables   
Absolute size .27* 
            (2.28) 
.60* 
            (2.29) 
Anglo-Saxon -.64* 
           (-2.31) 
            -1.24* 
           (-2.10) 
Geographical distance .18† 
             (1.84) 
.42† 
            (1.80) 
Cultural distance                .27* 
            (2.23) 
.49* 
            (2.14) 
CEO’s headquarters management position               -.30 
            (-.86) 
              -.90 
           (-1.41) 
Expatriate               .27 
           (1.08) 
.70 
            (1.42) 
Socialization               .01 
             (.11) 
              -.08 
            (-.30) 
 R2                .26  
Log Pseudolikelihood             -43.27 
AIC/BIC        AIC=1.33 BIC=-247.34 
 F-value              3.82  
P-value               .00  
 
Notes: (1) Significance level: †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed test). (2) In Model 8, the degree of 
board activeness is measured by summing and averaging the standard scores of the 21 board tasks. Robust 
regression estimation is used. T-scores are reported in parentheses. In Model 9, the degree of board activeness is 
measured by the percentage of tasks the board performs. Fractional logit model is used. Z-scores are reported in 
parentheses. (3) Standardized regression coefficients are reported. (4) Please see Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Survey Items Constructing Active Board 
 
Is there a board of directors in your subsidiary? 
 
 ○ yes                                       ○ no 
 
If yes, how much does the board of directors of your subsidiary perform the following tasks?    
 
1. Monitor the subsidiary’s CEO in decision-making 
2. Evaluate the subsidiary CEO’s performance  
3. Evaluate the subsidiary’s performance 
4. Appraise the subsidiary CEO’s compensation  
5. Take part in the selection of the subsidiary’s new top managers 
6. Review the subsidiary’s financial information for important issues 
7. Engage in the subsidiary CEO’s succession planning  
8. Take part in the formulation of the subsidiary’s strategic plan 
9. Identify the subsidiary’s  strategic direction  
10. Debate on the subsidiary’s strategic plan  
11. Facilitate the interactive between headquarters and the subsidiary 
12. Advise headquarters on subsidiary issues 
13. Informally communicate with the subsidiary’s CEO  
14. Informally communicate with headquarters  
15. Bring corporate culture into the subsidiary 
16. Provide knowledge of local economic, political and social conditions to the subsidiary’s 
CEO 
17. Provide advice and counsel to the subsidiary’s CEO  
18. Represent the subsidiary’s interests in local communities 
19. Communicate with local stakeholders 
20. Facilitate the access to local resources 
21. Serve as a link to local government agencies 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Number of Subsidiaries Performing Each Board Task (N=83) 
 
Survey items Nr. of subsidiaries (%) 
1. Monitor the subsidiary’s CEO in decision-making 52 (62.7%) 
2. Evaluate the subsidiary CEO’s performance  50 (60.2%) 
3. Evaluate the subsidiary’s performance 53 (63.9%) 
4. Appraise the subsidiary CEO’s compensation  40 (48.2%) 
5. Take part in the selection of the subsidiary’s new top managers 50 (60.2%) 
6. Review the subsidiary’s financial information for important issues 54 (65.1%) 
7. Engage in the subsidiary CEO’s succession planning  46 (55.4%) 
8. Take part in the formulation of the subsidiary’s strategic plan 50 (60.2%) 
9. Identify the subsidiary’s  strategic direction  49 (59%) 
10. Debate on the subsidiary’s strategic plan  50 (60.2%) 
11. Facilitate the interactive between headquarters and the subsidiary 53 (63.9%) 
12. Advise headquarters on subsidiary issues 53 (63.9%) 
13. Informally communicate with the subsidiary’s CEO  54 (65.1%) 
14. Informally communicate with headquarters  54 (65.1%) 
15. Bring corporate culture into the subsidiary 50 (60.2%) 
16. Provide knowledge of local economic, political and social 
conditions to the subsidiary’s CEO 48 (57.8%) 
17. Provide advice and counsel to the subsidiary’s CEO  51 (61.4%) 
18. Represent the subsidiary’s interests in local communities 39 (47%) 
19. Communicate with local stakeholders 38 (45.8%) 
20. Facilitate the access to local resources 40 (48.2%) 
21. Serve as a link to local government agencies 41 (49.4%) 
 
Page 46 of 46
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
